Abstract. The author analyzes the creation of the Japanese electric vehicle (EV) industry by focusing on how firms overcome barriers to bilateral collaboration and multilateral cooperation. The key to understanding this emerging industry is the evolution of interfirm relational skills under conditions constrained by uncertainty (for example, market failures compounded by bounded rationality and opportunism), yet which necessitate collaboration. The evolution of interfirm relations takes two forms: core firms and suppliers devise new means of bilateral relations in a situation where neither can invest in a committed relationship; competing auto makers and suppliers create and support multilateral institutions necessary to industry and market development. Evidence from EV auto-makersupplier bilateral relations and from auto-maker-supplier relations with multilateral institutions are analyzed for motive, mechanisms, and effect, and are categorized.
Introduction: uncertainty and cooperation
Throughout the world attempts are being made to jump start the electric vehicle (EV) industry (Quandt, 1995, pages 850-857) . The majority of these efforts are directed at alleviating environmental damage created by internal-combustion engines, but others are pointedly undertaken for industrial transformation and regional development (Scott, 1995b, pages 872-874) . In most EV-related literature the technical aspects of development are discussed, and although optimistic, the authors warn of the difficulties of practical EV use. Caveats are understandable in light of the fact that gasoline has 460 times the energy density of lead-acid batteries. EV development is also hindered because cars are still loved for convenience and their relative low cost, and the industry is supported by formidable investments in equipment, organization, and human capital. Nevertheless, it is claimed that these obstacles can be overcome by government policy and by interfirm collaboration (Scott, 1995a (Scott, , 1995b .
The technical and market problems facing EV development and some of the institutions designed to alleviate them have been described substantively elsewhere (Slifko and Rigby, 1995) . With this paper I add to that literature by analyzing how bilateral collaboration and multilateral cooperation, actually and potentially, occur in the EV industry of Japan; that is, in potentially large-scale production systems in embryonic stages of development. I build on Asanuma's (1989) concept of the relation-specific skill by examining its evolution in two capacities; its use by firms to overcome the uncertainties of bilateral collaboration in a new industry, and its use to create the multilateral cooperation necessary to initiate and develop the industry.
In a four-part structure I deal with: first, market failures and the imperatives for relational skill; second, firm strategy and the competitive structure of the industry; third, an analysis of the relational skills developed to overcome the risks of bilateral collaboration; and fourth, an analysis of cooperation in multilateral organizations and the relational skills used to overcome the shortcomings of bilateral relations. Data were obtained in interviews conducted in 1995 -96.
Interfirm relations and uncertainty in the EV industry
To understand the development of the EV industry in Japan it is necessary to consider the role of supplier relations and networks. It is well established that the internalcombustion engine vehicle (ICEV) industry evolved through the mutual dependence of automobile assemblers and suppliers (Odaka et al, 1988; Shimokawa, 1994) . Indeed, one of the great competitive strengths of the Japanese automobile industry is the ability of firms to exchange information on specifications, product materials, manufacturing, design, and delivery (Clark et al, 1987; Nishiguchi, 1994) . This competitive advantage is so great that it has been adopted by most of the world's automobile manufacturers (Womack et al, 1990) . Thus, as Japanese auto manufacturers purchase 80% of the value of ICEVs from suppliers, it may be presumed that their shift into EV production has been accompanied by the use of a similar production strategy. And as reliance on suppliers pervades Japanese assembly industries (Friedman, 1988; Fruin, 1992; Smitka, 1991) , it may be assumed that nonautomobile assembly and supplier firms entering the industry will do so expecting conventional Japanese production-system practices to prevail. This assumed reliance on outsourcing in EV development will be evidenced in following discussions, but the crucial factor for the development of an EV industry is whether the existing form of interfirm relations requires change. For, irrespective of whether EV production is undertaken by existing assemblers or by new assemblers, it will cause reconsideration of what constitutes any assembler's core technologies and how the assembler(s) relate to their suppliers. Thus, whether EVs are considered as a new product or as a new industry (Scott, 1995a) , their radically different composition makes probable the substantial alteration of production systems, the creation of new ones, and the evolution of the interfirm relations that make these possible and tie them together. This paper is focused on the evolution of those relations.
The understanding of interfirm relations used in this paper is based on Asanuma's (1989) concept of the relation-specific skill. This is defined as "the skill required on the part of the supplier to respond efficiently to the specific needs of the core firm. Formation of this skill requires that learning through repeated interactions with a particular core firm be added to the basic technological capability which the supplier has accumulated" (Asanuma, 1989, page 21) . Underlying the development of this skill is the potential for both partners not only to enhance a particular product but also to upgrade the technological and managerial capabilities of their firm. In particular, Asanuma showed how suppliers could, by developing the relation-specific skill, prove themselves to a core firm in order to win increased sales of a product and to obtain orders for more sophisticated products. Asanuma theorized that suppliers could also use these skills as the basis to develop business with other customers. Subsequently, the relation-specific skill was used to analyze industrial structural change and found to be important in helping both assemblers and suppliers to create new products and to upgrade firm abilities (Patchell, 1993a; 1993b; 1996) . Because firms can use the skill developed with one firm to improve business and relations with other firms, Asanuma (1) redefined the term 'relation-specific skill' to the more general, yet more powerful, 'relational skill'-that is, the ability of a supplier to work intensely with any core firm. It might be added that the developmental potential of any core firm is affected by its relational skills in dealing with suppliers.
Interfirm relations are not, however, only concerned with the exchange of materials and information, and their appropriate compensation. Uncertainty and risk control underlie the development of relational skills. Core firms, before increasing orders to suppliers, (n From a personal discussion with Banri Asanuma in 1995 in which he stated that he was modifying his concept of the relation-specific skill to relational skill, to encompass the flexibility of a firm using skills learned in one relation to develop other relations. make these suppliers prove that they can perform to high standards over time, and thus the core firms reduce the uncertainties that prevent efficient production planning. Asanuma and Kikutani (1992) made these factors explicit in their study of risk sharing by core firms, distributors, and suppliers in the control of production levels in the Japanese automobile industry. In this paper I follow their lead to understand industrial transformation; that is, I look at how core firms and suppliers use the relational skill to overcome the risk involved in entering the EV industry. In creating the EV industry, overcoming uncertainties and attendant risks, that preclude core firms and suppliers from collaborating, takes on added importance. Thus, without underestimating the technical problems facing the introduction of EVs, my premise is that the major hindrances to EV development are the uncertainties inherent to entering the industry which prevent firms from working together on production. How firms evolve the relational skill to overcome these uncertainties is the main thrust of this study.
Asanuma and Kikutani analyzed a mature auto industry, in which core firms had fashioned relation-specific skills over several decades. However, in the EV industry there is little production to be leveled, and there are different risks to be faced. The uncertainties inherent to any industry are amplified in EV development by the fact that the scale and complexity of initiating radically different automobile production produce formidable market failures. The most obvious of these failures is the inability to achieve increasing returns to scale. EVs require a competitive price to enter the market, but to achieve that price sales volumes must be high enough to justify the great investments necessary to achieve the low costs of mass production. A chicken-and-egg problem results, in which high production costs prevent the development of a market and a lack of market prevents the reduction of the high production costs. The market failures of search, matching, and coordination problems (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992 , page 76) also confront the EV industry. These transaction costs are especially high in EV development because virtually no component has a clear trajectory of development. Assemblers are faced with finding the most suitable and competitive technologies to build their EVs, and suppliers must find assemblers willing to help develop their technologies and must encourage investments to reduce production costs. The critical components-batteries and motors, in particular-can be made from different materials (varieties of lead, nickel, and lithium batteries; and conventional, permanent magnet, and rare metal motors). These can be constructed in different ways with varying levels of performance, convenience, and safety. Searching out and selecting the most promising technologies is a formidable task because, in addition to motors and batteries, bodies, brakes, "suspensions, air-conditioning, lights, and so on all have to be changed. The car makers and the suppliers both face coordination problems because new configurations of cars must be devised. The drive train will be transformed in conversion to electronic control, and with possibly radical changes: motors placed in the wheels; elimination of drive shaft, differentials, and radiators. These are not only technological problems: search, matching, and coordination also means finding the best firms to work with, ensuring design to specifications (or the suppliers must convince the assemblers to accept their specifications) and developing efficient production organization based on the input from a diversity of firms.
The most intractable market failure underlying EV development is the missing market. EVs are only a technological solution to the externality of pollution costs which are diffusely imposed by society onto society, and which are still for the most part accepted. Until the means to 'marketize' the value placed on a cleaner and less noisy environment are devised, overcoming this market failure remains a matter of government discretion and volition. Thus, inherent to the EV industry is not only the problem of establishing bilateral relations between core firms and suppliers, but also the problem of dealing with a third party interested in setting conditions for development. These conditions do not have to be a direct establishment of a market for EVs per se, but can help to solve issues related to the problems of increasing returns to scale and search, matching, and coordination. As I describe below, the role of the government and other third parties, acting to establish institutions for multilateral relations between firms, is critical to the industry.
Unfortunately, the uncertainties confronting firms in the EV industry arise not only from market failures, but also from their own bounded rationality and the opportunism prevalent in a competitive environment. Search, matching, and coordination problems cogently describe the bounded rationality of firms in determining an optimal selection of technologies and in designing and producing the product. For example, assemblers have limited knowledge of the diversity of EV technologies available, and suppliers have limited knowledge of how their specialized technology can be used in conjunction with other components and under road conditions. The planning limitations of firms are compounded by competing alternative-vehicle technologies (hydrogen, fuel cells, ethanol, hybrids) and by the manipulation and volatility of government policy.
Opportunism confronts the developing EV industry because, despite its birth pains, for the firms involved the stakes are high. The stakes for Toyota, Honda, and Nissan were their share of the critical California market, where (in the early 1990s) they were confronted with zero-emission requirements. Although these requirements have since been moderated, their impact on initiating EV development in Japan was critical. The EV could also diversify from a mature product in a mature market, develop new added value, redeploy workers, and develop a new product for export. And given the suicidal impact of a carbon-consuming Asia, enormous rewards could result from developing the EV technology for that market. But with increased stakes, suspicion of opportunistic behavior is also likely to increase. The greatest threats of opportunism to the EV industry are the incentive constraints that fear of a collaborator appropriating technological knowledge places on a firm's willingness to invest in research and development (R and D), equipment, training, and so on. Furthermore, if firms do proceed in what they believe is an opportunistic environment, they will likely monitor the actions of their collaborators and in so doing spend resources that could otherwise be invested more positively. In the precontract stage a supplier may be wary that a core firm will appropriate its technology and potential for increasing returns. The core firm may impose its terms on a firm just starting out, lacking financial ability, or lacking the knowledge necessary to develop automobile products. Conversely, a supplier may misrepresent its technology and engage a core firm to expend resources working with it when there is no medium-term or long-term value.
The hold-up problem is inherent to the auto industry because in the postcontract stage large investments are made in production-specific equipment. Similarly, there is a real threat of an EV collaborator being forced to suppress its rewards, because collaborators make investments in manufacturing and testing equipment and in human capital even in the development stage. The potential reasons for one partner to renege on its commitment are many: discounting the industry, more promising investments elsewhere, bankruptcy, and so on. The rate of technology development and number of alternatives for any component are such that suppliers, especially, have to worry that core firms will leave them for another supplier. Furthermore, as two firms purchasing and transferring information from one supplier to another is a common practice in the Japanese auto industry, innovative suppliers guard against appropriation of technology. Normally suppliers are compensated for these practices in the mass-production stage, and thus cooperate, but in the RandD stage these practices might have deleterious effects.
Market failures, compounded by bounded rationality and opportunism, are the uncertain foundations on which the EV industry is being established. Many of the means to overcome these hurdles already exist. For example, the relational contract is an open contract that allows firms to deal with contingencies as they arise in the course of their relationship (Milgrom and Roberts7T992) . These contracts could allow EV assemblers and contractors to adjust the terms of their transactions as market and technological conditions change. Similarly, incentive contracts could be constructed to adjust with the development of the EV industry Firm reputation can be expected to be an important governor of interfirm relations in the EV industry, as in any other industry. However, as effective as these tools are in overcoming market failures, they are made much more effective when the process which promotes their use is built into the system in a proactive way. The concept of the relational skill epitomizes this proactive process because it is the promotion of information flows and material flows between firms for their mutual benefit. The relational skill refocuses the understanding of interfirm relations: away from the contract in the relation, to the skill in developing the relation. This modification allows explanation of the various and flexible ways in which firms develop their relationship over time. This theoretical step enables an understanding of how firms break down barriers to bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
The conditions of uncertainty confronting the development of collaborative relations in the Japanese EV industry are formidable but, as several authors (Asanuma, 1985a; 1985b; Asanuma and Kikutani, 1992; Friedman, 1988; Womack et al, 1990 ) have illustrated, Japanese interfirm relations evolve. Interfirm cooperation is necessary to reduce the uncertainties blocking development of the EV industry, and new bilateral and multilateral relational skills and multilateral institutions are being created to meet that need.
Firm strategy and structure of the Japanese EV industry
In addition to the uncertainties confronting EV development, the evolution of relation skills will be influenced by the competitive structure of the industry and the strategy which a firm uses to position itself. This stage of EV development is extremely competitive, and progress takes place amid tense interdependence among assemblers who need to obtain the best technology available from any source, and among suppliers who must guard against the appropriation of their technology. The following discussion illustrates how different strategies taken by assemblers and suppliers-in complementarity and competition-push the evolution of relational skills.
Japanese EV development inherited the industrial structure of ICEV production. Mirroring the competitive nature of ICEV assembly, all of Japan's automobile makers have initiated EV development. In addition, several other companies have entered the industry. Their potential demand has attracted many suppliers to the EV arena, and these account for most of the members of JEVA (Japan Electric Vehicle Association). To determine how the relations between core firm (assembler) and supplier are conducted, the firms shown in figure 1 were interviewed. Underscoring the confidentiality of collaborative relations, of the core firms only the Environmental Agency (EA) and Kyocera offered direct access to their suppliers. These relations are designated on figure 1 by lines connecting the core-firm and supplier columns and further distinguishing suppliers and their respective core firms. These suppliers, however, worked with several core firms and described these relationships. These indirect connections are indicated by the dashed arrows. Aisin, Matsushita, and Denso were approached independently for insight into how Toyota's keiretsu^ relations are affected by EV (2) Keiretsu are corporate groupings of suppliers linked to assemblers through information transferral, personnel exchange, and investments. development. The assembly firms Daihatsu and Simon are designated as suppliers because they perform that role for other core firms.
Core firms
The EA is developing the Eco-vehicle, primarily to spur the development and diffusion of EV technology. Supported by public funds, there is no overriding concern with return on investment; but economy, practicality, appearance, and marketability are serious considerations. The project is unique, not only because of the direct government involvement, but also because suppliers work together directly to design and produce the EV. Daihatsu was chosen as the final assembler after the suppliers had had a chance to generate new approaches to development. This collaboration was initiated and held together by Shimizu (a key figure for advancing Japanese EV technology), who selected firms based on previous acquaintance or perception of the supplier's technological abilities. Like the EA, Kyocera is indirectly linked to the EV market, and its development process is experimental and designed to cultivate a market for its photovoltaic batteries. Because Japanese commuting distances average 40 km, Kyocera reasons that cars equipped with solar panels can obtain most of their energy needs from the sun. Thus it has developed solar racers and commuter cars to cultivate the market and to be prepared when the EV industry takes off. Kyocera will likely leave the manufacture of EVs to auto companies, and concentrate on developing solar fuel cells. It designs and assembles the EV and manufactures the solar panels, but leaves component and body construction to other firms. The number of employees involved varied from 4 to 10, depending on specific project demands.
Daihatsu, Toyota, and Honda, as established car makers, are most directly interested in manufacturing an EV that will return a profit. Daihatsu, which has been making EVs since 1967, has been the standard bearer for the EV throughout its ups and downs over the years. It has manufactured most of the EVs used in Japan, committed an assembly line to production, maintains an EV division, has hired employees specifically for EV production, and actively promotes awareness through publications and demonstrations. Daihatsu's approach arises from a belief in the environmental necessity of EVs and as a natural development from their focus on light automobiles. Yet Daihatsu's production has been of conversion cars, and it is collaborating with the EA to obtain information on purpose-built EVs. Another benefit is that of working with the EA suppliers, but for its production of 350 cars per year it utilizes keiretsu suppliers. Daihatsu's 50 EV RandD employees design most parts and, when necessary, teach suppliers how to manufacture them, but Daihatsu maintains proprietary rights over any special designs entrusted to suppliers. Its primary interest is in the internal development of the motor controller, which it considers the core of the vehicle. It chooses to outsource motors to retain flexibility to match appropriate motors to different chassis.
Toyota and Honda have been making EVs for twenty years, but when California announced its zero-emission regulations, they accelerated the pace of development. In contrast to the previous three firms, which are designing cars for Japan, Toyota and Honda's development programs are shaped by the California commute because it is their most competitive market. They maintain a balance between obtaining the best technologies available from suppliers while retaining control over their core technologies. Toyota has about 100 people working on EVs; Honda (including scooter and bicycle research) has 200. These people are developing various components for EVs, but both companies said that as car makers they have to manufacture motors and controllers as the heart of the machine and the source of most of its value. But all suppliers, not only motor or controller manufacturers, must consider how much information they can share with firms possessing such deep development capabilities. Both companies claim that they will maintain existing keiretsu relations in EV production, but insist that they will go with the best technology whoever possesses it, and look towards US firms as an important source. Despite the stimuli of California's regulations, both firms stressed that their EV RandD is for long-term consideration and that they look to the next century for the technology and market conditions suitable for production.
The structure of the EV assembly-firm segment also benefits from specialist and special-concern firms. Tokyo R&D specializes in EV design and engineering. It has made most of the EVs for the power companies and the EA, does work for the auto companies, is the dominant maker of EV racing cars, and produces electric scooters. To develop new technologies, Tokyo R&D eschews keiretsu or regional allegiances in order to collaborate freely with hundreds of suppliers. Co-op is a grocery cooperative which decided to stop fouling the air of its members and enlisted Izusu to design and produce an EV delivery truck.
Suppliers
Component suppliers have the opportunity to redefine their products as the industry shifts from conversion cars to purpose-built cars, and from mechanical control and structure to electronic control and electric configuration. This shift suggests that the manufacturing organization and interfirm relations of the ICEV industry could be substantially altered (Shinohara, 1991, page 224) . Radiators, drive trains, and gas tanks are out; electric motors, controllers, and batteries are in; tires, bodies, steering systems are modified. Yet, impressed with what it takes to design a car, its manufacturing process, testing, and to pass government regulations and get the car on the road, suppliers are not interested in confronting the car makers. Suppliers, overwhelmingly, are concerned with developing their core competencies: either through research to refine their technology into more sophisticated applications, or through adapting them to new fields. Thus despite controlling key technologies (such as batteries and motors), and although some have bought or built their own car for testing purposes, suppliers are not interested in making an EV. Furthermore, monetary return from collaboration is not a short-term concern.
Development of core competencies reflects the technological composition of the EV and the rapid technological evolution of those components. Evolution is encouraged by the high level of competition in the auto-parts industry and by the possibility of new entrants from the electric/electronic and materials industries which are also highly competitive. It is necessary for these firms to collaborate with the auto makers, but they confront the predicament of how to do so while hanging on to their own technology. The interviews provided evidence that opportunism arises in all four main-component segments of the industry (batteries, drive train and motor, body and components, and external devices). Below, I illustrate how the different conditions in the battery and motor segments create parameters for the development of different relational skills. In addition I discuss how the compensation for design is neglected in the evolution of interfirm relations and the EV influence on Toyota's keiretsu relations.
The collaborative development of batteries exemplifies how car companies keep their options open while maintaining relations with several competing firms and ensuring standardization of the dimensions and connections of the product. The stakes in battery competition are especially high. For EV makers small increases in automobile range will create a great advantage, and for battery makers EVs could vastly increase their sales. At the time of this research, Nihon Battery held 90% of the EV lead-acid market and worked with all car makers except Honda. The commitment of the Ecovehicle project to conventional batteries plays to Nihon Battery's manufacturing strengths but, in the near future, battery use will change. Thus 40 people have been assigned to develop nickel and lithium batteries. Battery makers are in an intense situation because they must work with car makers to solve discrepancies between laboratory performance and road performance. Nihon battery, for example, is only one of five battery firms in Toyota's cooperative firm association. It knows that its dominance is fragile because the dynamics of the industry are changing from competition on manufacturing margins to differences in performance of the battery. In fact Toyota and Matsushita, and Nissan and Sony, have been collaborating on the development of high-performance nickel and lithium batteries. The Matsushita-Toyota joint venture has developed a nickel/metal-hydride battery which is likely to become the short-term industry standard. Providing 200 km to a charge, completely recyclable, and already produced at a reasonable price, the costs of this battery can be driven much lower with economies of scale in production. Matsushita believes it can be made to last for the lifetime of the vehicle. It is for these reasons that all Japanese automakers have committed themselves to buying from the Matsushita -Toyota venture. Even Nissan has decided to utilize this battery because the costs of a lithium battery developed with Sony remain too high for near-term use. This is the first time Nissan has purchased directly from a Toyota subsidiary, and indicates the intensity of EV-technology competition (Nikkei 1996) . Yet Matsushita knows that the life span of nickel/ metal-hydride is limited because lithium batteries will eventually double their charge distance and because Toyota and others are developing fuel cells. Thus Matsushita is continuing R and D into other technologies and, along with Japan's other battery makers, is a member of the Lithium Battery Energy Storage Technology Research Association.
Motors are the most problematic focus of collaboration because they represent a core technology of auto firms and also because of intense competition amongst suppliers. Yaskawa and Meidensha are two of the larger manufacturers of motors and controllers, but their initial forays into collaboration produced different outcomes. Yaskawa flirted with auto makers for a year, but its directors decided tc^abdft: the linkages for fear of losing technology to the auto firms. The decision was made despite the company's desire to enter a mass-production market and to lower its dependency on capital-equipment sales. Another problem was that the auto makers did not offer their mass-production know-how in return for motor technology. Meidensha is the key motor-collaboration partner with two of Japan's big five auto firms. Unlike Yaskawa, its relations are longstanding, based on motor sales for other purposes. However, length and trust in those relationships provide no guarantee of a fair outcome from collaboration. Meidensha relies on its greater knowledge of motors, the fact that different types of EVs will require different motors, its manufacturing abilities, and ultimately patents, to secure its position in relations with the automakers. In contrast with the tight-lipped auto assemblers, Yaskawa and Meidensha's other collaborations are uninhibited. Yaskawa freely interacts with Kyocera and controls production of the motor and controller. In the Eco-vehicle project, Meidensha works with several collaborators to make a motor that fits inside each wheel-and the patent is shared by all six partners.
Two firms perform design roles and illustrate a problematic aspect of Japanese interfirm relations. The design company Form is responsible for envisioning the physical design and market strategy for the Eco-vehicle. These tasks require experience, creativity, and the time actually spent conceptualizing and drawing up the designs and strategies. Unfortunately, the experience and effort demanded in design usually go unrewarded in Japanese interfirm transactions and only hardware receives credit for compensation. This is a problem even in the Eco-vehicle project: Form was disconcerted when it was paid only for its one-time effort and found that the final assembler would not have to pay any royalties. In contrast, other Eco-vehicle collaborators gain through production and patents. Similarly, Simon is a small firm supporting itself through manufacturing plastic bumpers, but also designs and constructs solar-car bodies for Kyocera and Sanyo. Its compensation reflects hardware production more than the design contribution, to which it loses all title. Although Simon claims that a larger firm would receive rights to designs and three times the compensation, it continues because the owner and employees enjoy the stimulus of constant innovation.
Most suppliers interviewed workers with many automakers and prove that keiretsu walls are breached by competition for suppliers' advanced products. That said, keiretsu relations remain important, and the Toyota group in particular is a formidable EV force. Amongst Toyota, Aisin, and Denso (interviewed), 250 people were committed directly to EV R and D. Other close members developing EV components are Toyoda Machine Works (steering system) and Toyoda Automatic Loom (charging system). Toyota suppliers were among the most conspicuous at the 13th World EV Symposium in Osaka.
However, EV development has affected keiretsu relations. Denso makes air conditioners, vacuum pumps, state-of-charge indicators, power-generation control units for hybrids, and propulsion-control units for EVs. Aisin makes fuel-cell components, drive-system components, and energy-regeneration components. Toyota's relations with these two firms differ: it only works with Denso on development of air conditioners although it is working with several motor manufacturers other than Aisin. Toyota instigates indirect competition amongst motor makers at this early level of development, with different motor types developed by different suppliers. The less intense competition in air-conditioner production and Denso's leading expertise is likely why Toyota relies solely on Denso. However, relations of the two firms with Toyota are similar in the high degree of interaction. Aisin has 10 people working directly with Toyota on EVs and Denso's proximity to Toyota lets them work together on a daily basis. Both firms were happy to concentrate their development efforts with Toyota. It allowed focus on one design and high performance, rather than fragmenting their efforts to satisfy several customers. However, once past initial development, they work with several customers. This approach is encouraged by Toyota to lower production costs. If Toyota requests that other suppliers be allowed to manufacture the same product, the developing firm's manufacturing expertise is not transferred and it is awarded royalties.
The structure of the EV industry shapes firm strategies to a great extent by forcing firms to develop multiple collaboration partners. This is exemplified by Toyota's assertion that it must use the most competitive technology: thus, it developed a nickel/metalhydride battery with Matsushita, while its group firm Toyoda Automatic Loom works with Yuasa on a similar battery. That this competitiveness must be reconciled with intense information exchange and the need for trust is the greatest stimulus to the evolution of relational skills. Unique strategies may also influence the general evolution of relational skills. All those working in the Eco-vehicle project praised the benefits of working directly with other suppliers and involvement in the design of the whole car, rather than just being told what to make and how to make it by an auto assembler. Furthermore, the desire of established car makers to retain the benefits of their keiretsu organizations also shapes the evolution of relational skills. Thus, within the uncertainly inherent to this emerging industry, competitive positioning, along with novel and traditional production organization, fashion the evolution of the relational skills examined in the following two sections.
Overcoming uncertainty: relational skills of bilateral institutions
The EV industry is still in the early development stage and interfirm relations are dominated by collaborative RandD. The uncertainty of RandD results creates the parameters for the creation of relational skills. The collaborative relations identified in this paper vary from original equipment manufacture and design-approved modifications, where relatively little information is exchanged between firms, to more intensive relations including: on-site visits to work on design, cost sharing, use of collaborator's equipment, and testing of each others' developments. In addition to product-specific information, firms exchange an understanding of the partner firm's technological abilities, costs, and management practices. Thus, when collaborating, each firm is learning about the other's business advantages and disadvantages, and how to negotiate with it. The potential for opportunism in collaborative relations is, therefore, higher than in simple market transactions. In bilateral relations, the creativity of managers and engineers is challenged not only by the technological and production uncertainties of EV development, but also by the problem of how to overcome the threat of opportunism. Table 1 lists some of the different types of relational skills used to overcome these interrelated problems.
The left column lists the relational skills fashioned to break down barriers to collaboration. The next two columns indicate the use of these relations by core firms and by suppliers, respectively. Depending on the case, the relational skill may be offered by the core firm or by the supplier. In most cases core firms and suppliers are both offerer and receiver, indicating that that type of relation has become standard business practice. Many of the relations overlap with others and are dependent on them; however, they are not used uniformly and each firm's usage will vary according to the situation. Car companies, in particular, often have the power to impose their conditions on suppliers. The strategy of having multiple R and D partners is at once the safest way for a company to proceed and also the most problematic. As no best technology can be determined, the strategy of multiple R and D partners ensures that a firm can access a variety of information sources and firms to work with. However, multiple collaboration is problematic because it divides a firm's resources and, especially in regard to credible relations between firms, raises the problem of guaranteeing each firm confidentiality. Most of the relational skills that follow are utilized to overcome this problem. This strategy is most important for the suppliers who are trying to refine their core competency. Suppliers, it seems, even at the collaboration stage, are interested in working with a number of core firms to define their economies of scale and scope. Core firms are more ambivalent. The EA purposely worked with only one supplier per component in order to increase trust among collaborators. Suppliers appreciated an assembler taking that approach, but almost all suppliers also worked with other EV core firms. Because of the stakes involved, Honda and Toyota insisted that they must keep their options open but, at the same time, preferred to work with one or two suppliers. Toyota would work with one or a few depending on the type of part and their assessment of the supplier's technological expertise. Daihatsu purposely did not make its own motor, but relied on different suppliers to produce models optimal for specific chassis. In comparison with the big car makers, Tokyo R and D's creative advantage depends on switching freely among suppliers. After internal trial-and-error and external search processes, both Kyocera and Co-op settled into stable relations with one supplier per component. Their single-firm practice results from small scale of production and lack of relevant know-how However, from the perspective both of assemblers and of suppliers (excepting the Eco-vehicle project), an implicit assumption prevailed that collaborators were free to work with other firms.
All firms, even Yaskawa after it severed relations with the car firms, took the competitiveness of the industry as 'fair ball'. Matsushita also emphasized that producing the best-performance lowest-cost product is the simple criterion for success. It saw no logic in or likelihood of using its success in developing the industry-standard battery to further the Matsushita group's sales of other EV components. Further, collaboration with a firm working with many other firms increases the likelihood of accessing the most accepted technology and a possible standard. But, access to a competitor's technology through a supplier is difficult because of suppliers'confidentiality restrictions. Conversely, a car maker may encourage suppliers to work with other firms to enable necessary investments in R and D.
Selection and termination are closely tied to multiple R and D partners. Core firms have the prerogative to choose which firm or firms they will finally work with and, at the time of writing, the winnowing process was just beginning. However, its occurrence in the Japanese auto industry is a significant development. Traditionally, keiretsu suppliers were compensated for R and D over the course of a production run (that is how Honda defines collaboration), but for some collaborating firms that will not occur. One proposal which car makers considered to alleviate this loss was to promise to allot some manufacturing of the winning technology to the loser firm. This practice would penalize the winning firm, but the two-firm buying policy is an accepted practice in the auto industry and the winning firm will be allowed to maintain license royalties, higher compensation, or some other benefit.
Contracts are typically used to govern specific projects, although much information which is not legally protected flows between firms. Collaboration contracts are relational contracts that set the objectives of collaboration and means for dealing with contingencies which arise (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, page 131) . Most of the relations which I investigated were governed by contracts, and most were open-ended-leaving many of the results of present research to be negotiated and future developments to be considered in due course. But difficulties in determining contributions, costs, and benefits are not the primary reason for the use of relational contracts: speed is. According to Matsushita, too much time spent wrangling over responsibilities would delay development of the components. That said, the parameters of collaboration contracts are constructed to be cost and result efficient.
Efficiency controls are carried into EV collaboration because Japanese auto firms have developed interfirm production systems that combine flexibility over supply and price with differentiated accountability on labour, capital, depreciation, equipment usage, and engineering costs (Asanuma, 1985a, page 40 ). Honda's contract structure exemplifies how this accountability and flexibility is maintained. In contrast to contracts utilized in mass-production interfirm relations, Honda arranges payment contracts limited to R and D: that is, it pays a supplier to do directed research. However, if a product is used, costs are expected to be buried in production, and even when not used no compensation accrues for costs related to general machinery and training. In R and D for standard components (for example, batteries), no costs are assumed. Costs, efficiency, and information exchange are all considered in the construction of the contract, but engineering and research costs are difficult to determine. Usually, component suppliers prepare estimates, but as trial devices usually cost 10 -20 times more than mass-production devices, costs are negotiated and often the result is half of the estimate price. Honda compensates a supplier when it modifies a standard product according to Honda's design.
Suppliers have a hard time gaining adequate compensation for engineering and RandD because of the hardware focus of auto-industry relations. Standard contracts govern these agreements, but as a project moves farther away from hardware to software (the best example is Form's design work) it becomes increasingly difficult to gain compensation. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has recognized this problem and enlisted Form's president to help write a handbook for design contracts. This instance is a good example of the evolution of Japanese interfirm relations pushed by the strategies of suppliers. However, despite compensation difficulties, suppliers are protected against some risk and in effect have the development of their core competency subsidized. That is their primary concern, and most are confident that core-competency development will result in benefits they can guarantee. Thus in addition to R-and-Dlimited contracts, some contracts do not provide for compensaTiM^rbuTestablish other guidelines for working together. The primary considerations are that secrecy be maintained and, if patents are applied for, negotiations between firms must take place.
Patents are looked upon by firms as the best guarantee of future returns and protection against appropriation of their technology. Firms naturally want to take outright claim to a patent, and in collaborations where the development onus is on the supplier there is generally no problem with that process. Suppliers can also take out patents individually when they work intensely with core firms. As mentioned above, collaborators may be required to notify each other when applying for a patent; the relative shares of each partner are then negotiated. These negotiations are a difficult process in which various expenses and the origin of ideas must be considered. A bilateral or combined patent may be applied for in the infrequent cases where a solution cannot be found, or, if by previous agreement it has been decided to seek a bilateral patent. Bilateral patents are common but multilateral patents occurred only in the Eco-vehicle project, where direct collaboration of suppliers enabled as many as six partners to a patent. Conversely, the auto firms usually maintain strict bilateral control over all development and thus there is little likelihood of multilateral patents. The Eco-vehicle project also imposed the necessity that all patents taken were held in part by the government. As in other government initiatives, the intention is to make the technology cheaply available to all firms. For that reason some firms are reticent about working on government projects, with even those in the Eco-vehicle project cautious. Yet, as important as patents are to individual companies, they are more important to the health of the EV industry as a whole. When a firm knows that its compensation rights are protected it can freely do business with many firms and diffuse new technology through the industry.
Core firms are not opposed to relations with patent-holding firms. Honda claimed that they indicated that a supplier held important technology, and Toyota invests in US firms to gain access to their patents. Thus, licensing is an obvious impetus for patent application and, although I was not told of existing licensing agreements, several firms mentioned royalties as an objective and a recourse. Given the competitive pressure to use best components, there will be ample opportunity to license. And given the policy of second sourcing, a supplier may have to license technology to ensure its use. However, the initial low volume of EV production mitigates the pressure to license. Furthermore, core firms consider it ineffective to apply pressure by using other firms competing on price or a similar technology.
Exchange of personnel occurs in varying degrees amongst several firms, but is strongest amongst the keiretsu groups. However, this exchange is not done without accounting for costs and benefits. Length of assignment and which firm ultimately receives the patent or other benefits from collaboration determines which firm pays the cost of the seconded employees. Again, most of these costs and benefits will be negotiated after collaboration is initiated, to speed development. Joint ventures are more complicated than personnel exchanges, and the Matsushita-Toyota effort is the only one that I am aware of In this collaboration, as Matsushita possesses the battery technology it is the senior partner, and retains rights to all patents. However, it needs Toyota's expertise and cooperation to determine how these batteries will perform under road conditions. Perhaps the Sony-Nissan effort will evolve into a joint venture because of the need for close collaboration.
Internalized competition designates the need to mitigate tensions arising from the core firms' interest in internally developing key and high-value-added technologies and the fact that these developments may compete with the technologies of its collaborators. As an example, Toyota established research teams to work on various components and is the only automobile company developing its own motor-controller system. Yet it has strong relations with motor manufacturers. Toyota deals with this tension by being as 'up front' as possible with its collaborators, and by separating its internal team from its collaboration team. This separation may be done within the same building or in different locations (for example, one team at the Mount Fuji RandD centre and one at Toyota headquarters). Suppliers respond in kind to the core firm's confidentiality requirements. The bigger the supplier, the greater the likelihood it will create a special team to work with each core firm, or even physically separate these teams. Denso called this separation an "iron wall".
Despite the different relational skills mentioned so far, negotiations are a dominant characteristic of collaboration, and relations are susceptible to manipulation. All core firms and suppliers emphasized that unimpeded collaboration depended on trust Trust existed at the firm, department, and personal levels. Long-standing relations between firms may have no bearing when different divisions within them begin to interact. Conversely, relations initiated and nurtured by R and D personnel of two firms may be quashed by superiors. Furthermore, when the relationship moves beyond R and D, production managers and purchasers reconsider the project. Thus, building trust between two firms depends on building a commitment within both firms. Clear statements of the firm's EV strategy and policy concerning multiple collaboration, specification of what products it intends to develop, creation of the contract and patent conditions mentioned previously, and other forms of transparency all contribute to building trust between firms. Yet at present that trust is not complete. Suppliers want core firms to be more open and want to learn more about the development of the whole EV and its mass production.
Perhaps the most important governor of these relations is reputation. Component manufacturers must stay on good terms with core firms to obtain feedback on their product's road-condition performance. Car makers are in a more tenuous situation. Unlike the conventional auto industry, extending the range of an EV a mere twenty miles will be a dominating advantage, and thus no car maker can risk creating a climate which discourages the best technology suppliers from working with it. Even the strongest firm, Toyota, insisted that they had to maintain their reputation for trustworthiness or else the best suppliers would not deal with them. Could it be that the strongest car companies are those which develop the most transparent relational skills and back them up by playing fair?
Multilateral institutions
Despite the tension between core firms and suppliers, a great deal of successful collaboration is going on in the EV industry. Yet all firms emphasized that tensions between firms precluded smooth development of the industry and that firms needed third-party assistance to create the cooperation necessary to develop the industry. Multilateral institutions have evolved for that reason. The existence and need for multilateral institutions in the EV industry, such as Calstart and the US battery consortium, have already been noted (Scott, 1995b, page 873; Slifko and Rigby, 1995) . To this literature I add not only the imperatives that are driving the Japanese to develop these institutions, but also the tensions and mechanisms for resolution that exist within these institutions.
Cooperation is necessary not only for core-firm-supplier relations, but also among core firms and among suppliers of particular components. Core firms have common interest in the broad development of the market and its technologies. They shape, and connections. Component makers can also sell more if their goods are compatible with all cars, and thus have an interest in car-maker cooperation. However, the ability to achieve or enforce direct cooperation or, for example, several car makers to establish a standard by supporting only one component maker, is limited by antitrust laws. Cooperation could also lower costs through combining production abilities to achieve economies of scale on one or a few cars rather than each firm making its own. However, the idea of car manufacturers or even similar component manufacturers combining production was considered unfeasible by all firms given the intensity of competition in the industry. There is scope, however, for other means of cooperation to lower costs and to develop the market. Several types of multilateral institutions have evolved to promote cooperation across and within specific segments of the EV industry. I have listed these institutions in table 2 as governments, sponsors, promotion societies, and universities. Also shown are the relational skills they have developed to overcome the uncertainties of market failures and opportunism and thus tie several firms together in cooperation.
In the national government, MITI, the EA, the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications are involved in EV development. MITI takes charge of overall technical and market promotion, while the other ministries cultivate their own turf. For example, whereas MITI is concerned with the development of products, processes, and organization of the industry, the EA sets standards for environmental protection, and the Ministry of Transport is entrusted to ensure that products brought to market conform to safety, performance, and environmental standards. However, little direct coordination exists between the ministries, save joint participation in some exhibits. Personnel from these agencies seemed content with this lack of coordination. The director of the Eco-vehicle project, however, was frustrated because he would receive ten times the financial support if the project was part of MITI rather than of the EA.
MITI may be considered the coach of Japan's EV industry as it utilizes all the relational skills listed in table 2. It sponsored a large-scale project in 1971 (¥5.7 billion over six years) which gave birth to the Japanese EV industry, but since that time has scaled down its expenditures and direct management. It spent ¥170 million in 1995 for EV field tests, and ¥1260 million to develop new batteries. Within MITI, the New Energy Development Organization (NEDO) is responsible for EVs and, along with funneling money to other organizations, produces analyses of the industry which are constantly referenced by firms. Thus MITI contributes to the reduction of information costs. The ministry also does technical research which companies are welcome to join, but resulting patents are for public use. MITI established a goal of 200 000 EVs by the year 2000 in an attempt to give firms a signal to enter the industry. However, firms decided that EV technology was too immature for production and, as in 1995 there were only 2000 in use, it is unlikely that that goal will be met. Neither will MITI's goal of 2000 charging stations be attained. It is actually circumspect about EV usage, and prefers to pursue a strategy of 'appropriate alternative vehicle in appropriate usage'. Still, MITI is definitely the most powerful government force in the EV industry; it established and partially funds JEVA to develop and administer EV programs.
The EA, in addition to monitoring the environment and establishing protection guidelines, also established the Eco-vehicle project as a proactive means of protecting the environment. This project, however, is very much the entrepreneurial effort of one respected individual in the agency, and would not have been initiated without his efforts. The project is intended to catalyze the industry and to diffuse technologies and patents developed at low cost. That is a typical means employed by the government to foster industrial transformation and was particularly successful in the development of the SCARA robot (Patchell, 1991) . The Transportation Ministry fosters working groups amongst automakers and suppliers to develop standards which will be used as the base of its regulations. The Ministry of Posts and Communication weighs in by using EVs for delivery.
Prefectures and municipalities are considered local governments and many of these, independently and in combination, are involved in trial use and development of EVs. JEVA (1995, page 38) lists eleven governments as users of its leasing program. Although initiated locally, these programs depend on MITI for technological and organizational assistance and much of their funding. Political autonomy of local governments is relatively weak and they are only able to legislate minor laws and ordinances: thus there will be no California-style legislation coming out of them. However, local conditions prompt initiatives and governments have committed considerable resources to development, administration, and promotion of their programs. Spurred on by particularly bad airborne particulates, Osaka City developed the world's most comprehensive charging system to ensure that EV operators are never more than 5 km from a charging station. This program lowers the risks that users and suppliers undertake.
Local governments work in concert with power firms, which are the most important sponsors of EV development. Power companies are regional monopolies which have an obvious interest in promoting power usage. In particular, firms with a high reliance on nuclear and hydropower generation believe that nighttime oversupply can be absorbed by EVs recharging. Power companies sponsor the industry in many ways: development of experimental EVs and components; working with battery and automobile companies in testing and trial use; publishing information and participating in promotional events; joining in national and local projects; and operating their own vehicles. In so doing, manufacturer-information costs and risks of entry into the industry are reduced. Sponsorship is most evident in the buying of cars, the development of infrastructure, and the subsidization of local government activities. Power companies retain patents to devices developed with their assistance, but are not interested in manufacturing EVs or components. As such, patents are available for licensing and promote technological diffusion. Each power company undertakes these efforts to some degree, and are all members of JEVA. Furthermore, the Federation of Electric Power Companies promotes cooperation among members on EV development, and thereby lends another level of coordination to the industry. In particular, their deep-pocketed and overt interest signals the viability of the industry to potential entrants. Of course, because they are regional monopolies, cooperation amongst-power firms is much easier than amongst auto manufacturers. Other sponsors include nonprofit organizations such as universities, parks, and the housing and urban development corporation. Among private organizations, airline companies lease EVs.
JEVA is the largest promotion society and is most important for its coordination and management activities. It is a nonprofit foundation cosponsored by 47 member companies and organizations and 74 support companies and organizations (JEVA, 1995) . These members include all the automakers, power companies, major component manufacturers, trading firms, research institutions, and many other smaller firms and organizations. Foreign firms are allowed to join the association if they have a Japanese subsidiary. The president is seconded from MITI, and the Ministry's influence is evident in that larger firms are expected to fund JEVA substantially more than do smaller firms or organizations. Despite the fact that all participating firms have equal access to JEVA's information, only a few large firms complain about their unequal burden. However, some wish to have their fees reduced or to drop out when the industry is established. Because of competition among members, much of JEVAs 16 employees' time is spent mediating tensions between them.
JEVA's greatest expenditure is a trial-use program in which it subsidizes leasing. Although it leaves program management to local governments, JEVA helps coordination by drawing firms into participation. A critical part of JEVA's coordination activities is the establishment of standards. That is the activity in which car and component manufacturers alike are most happy to have a neutral party mediating their differences. Each firm has a tendency to follow its competitive instincts and develop its own technology, but knows that if their vehicles or components lack compatibility market development will be slow. JEVA's standards become JAS (Japan Association of Standards) standards and it coordinates the compatibility of Japanese, US, and ISO standards. JEVA does not do technical research or produce patents on its own, but leaves that to individual companies.
It does, however, analyze the Japanese and other EV industries and publishes that information. Another major activity is organizing exhibits, such as regional displays of manufacturers' developments and the 13th EV Expo in Osaka.
Other promotion societies include the previously mentioned Lithium Battery Energy Storage Technology Research Association (LIBES), an EV subcommittee to the R and D committee of the Japanese Automobile Manufacturer's Association (JAMA), the Society for Electric Vehicles (SEV), and the EV Club. LIBES is part of MITI's new sunshine project to level Japan's electricity production through dispersed storage of long-life stationary batteries and high-density EV batteries. Besides the battery companies, several electric-machinery and materials firms are involved in LIBES. Shimizu of the Eco-vehicle project heads JAM As EV subcommittee, and it is a discussion group for the technical development of EVs. SEV and the EV club are grass-roots organizations performing valuable roles in reducing information costs and signaling the development of the industry. SEV organizes monthly seminars featuring speakers from government, industry, universities, and other organizations. These attract a large audience of people from the same type of institutions and the general public. In addition to the technical promotion of EVs, the society is concerned with relating EVs to societal concerns. SEV is often the first introduction to EVs for people in related industries. The organizer of the society devotes much of his time to networking and keeping abreast of developments and is a one-stop (free) shop for information. The EV club is a group of enthusiasts who share information, build their own EVs, run building clinics, and organize races. The clinics run for several weekends and always are oversubscribed. The races are important to spur technological development, and for introducing firms to potential collaborators and to what the competition is doing. Many corporations sponsor these races for technological and PR reasons. Magazines are also showing a growing interest in serving the needs of these EV enthusiasts.
Universities play a complementary role in the EV industry. There is not an entrepreneurial culture in Japanese academe, nor do Japanese firms fund their research in the same manner they do US academics. Until recently the government did not encourage academics to be enterprising, nor does MITI work with academics in its EV development. The Eco-vehicle project was the only organization in which academics took direct advisory roles. However, many professors perform EV research and assemblers and component manufacturers maintain relations with them. The information which firms obtain from academics is thus, for the most part, free. Furthermore, academics are highly respected in Japan, and when they express opinions in forums such as SEV or the EV Expo they perform a signaling function for manufacturers.
There are some obvious gaps in coordination amongst these multilateral institutions, such as the lack of coordination between ministries. However, overlap between the activities of the organizations gives the industry a loose and flexible organization. The human networks in these overlapping institution play a crucial role in keeping firms and institutions aware of each other's activities.
In order to determine how a market-based approach can be used to show how industries can evolve-and in particular how an environmentally friendly industry can evolve-there can be a tendency to focus only on the marketplace dynamics and to ignore the necessary contributions that other institutions can bring to bear. However, it was the firms themselves which insisted that multilateral institutions must be positively created and utilized to initiate and foster the industry. They back these institutions precisely because they know what intense competitors they are and because they know what is at stake if they fail to cooperate with each other. The investigations into multilateral institutions undertaken in this research were an addition prompted by an awareness of the importance of these institutions as the research progressed; further clarification of the dynamics between bilateral and multilateral relations is required.
Conclusion
This analysis of interfirm relations in the Japanese EV industry is not offered as a normative model of industry initiation or transformation. Obstacles to collaboration still exist, and the way in which firms interact in this industry is surely only one of many possible configurations. Nor do I claim that the research presented is comprehensive. It is limited by the number of firms interviewed and by my ability to discern both the number and the types of uncertainties obstructing collaboration and the relational skills used to overcome them. I am sure the individuals in the organizations interviewed are more creative than depicted here. However, the research does suggest another picture of the dynamism of interfirm relations in the Japanese automobile industry, and how the actors react to the stress of immediate demands. They are not stuck in closed keiretsu, but relations are reshaped, closed, and opened. Firms concentrated their EV development within their keiretsu when EV development was a pet project of the government, but when California's zero-emission laws became a reality Japanese auto firms were pushed into new forms of collaboration. Firms use some similar methods, but each firm has different strengths and weaknesses and thus each has developed different strategies to achieve successful collaboration. To these different systems, overall EV coordination is added by government and other multilateral institutions. Yet even these institutions lend only a loose integration to the coordination necessary to the development of the EV industry-a loose integration that enables the competition which firms need to stimulate their development.
Moreover, in my analysis I have intended to create a new focus on how industries, especially those desired for environmental or any other policy rationale, can be created. That focus is on the uncertainties that hinder the collaboration of firms. Japanese EV firms have proven adept at creating new variations of relational skills to overcome these obstacles. Thus this research suggests that it may be wiser to focus on the relation as the nexus of interfirm relations, rather than the contract. Another contribution has been to draw multilateral organizations into the consideration of how firms cooperate. The EV firms insisted that multilateral institutions are crucial to building the cooperation that is necessary to build the industry. Finally, an essential premise in this analysis is that the rational self-interest of firms need not conflict with the evolution of interfirm cooperation. Rather, firms must devise relational skills to mediate the tensions arising from their dual needs for competitive freedom and control over development.
